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I. INTRODUCTION
In general, a referral sale is a scheme whereby a purchaser is induced
to buy a product upon the understanding that he will receive money or
credit on his purchase if he induces others to make similar purchases.
The utilization of the referral sales device brings into play many different
facets of the law. The law of sales governs the seller-buyer relationship.
The law of negotiable instruments deals with the rights and obligations
of all the parties to the note. Their position after the transfer of the note
may be affected by the law of assignments. Deceptive advertising or
promotional practices may be subject to action by the Federal Trade
Commission. And finally, the law of chattel security operates upon the
rights of the dealer and his successor in interest, the financing institution.
The following is a brief example of how the scheme operates. The
potential purchaser is told that if he will submit a certain number of
names of persons who might make similar purchases, he will receive a
specified commission, to be applied against his debt to the seller. The
prospects will be given a similar "opportunity."' Under a commission
agreement the earnings will not only pay for the item purchased, but also
will yield an indeterminate amount of profit. After the agreement to
purchase is entered into, a promissory note is executed and subsequently
assigned to a finance house. Trouble develops when the third-party
financing agent claims the status of a holder in due course and attempts
to enforce the purchaser's obligation, and is met with the defense that
the seller did not in good faith attempt to sell to the list of prospects
and the commissions have not been forthcoming.
* Associate Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor for Freshman
Research and Writing.
1. The supply of buyers will be exhausted at the end of only a few rounds. In Norman
v. World Wide Distrib., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1953) plaintiffs introduced
evidence to show that at the end of 20 months of operation, it would require 17 trillion
salesmen to carry on the referral program World Wide described to the plaintiffs. Id. at 57,
195 A.2d at 117. See also Sherwood & Roberts-Yakima, Inc. v. Leach, 67 Wash. 2d 630,
634, 409 P.2d 160, 163 (1965) (the court explains the phenomenon of market saturation).
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This comment is designed to ascertain what protection is afforded
the consumer against fraudulent sellers in the area of referral sales with
special emphasis upon the two approaches which have met with the most
success, namely lotteries and unconscionability.
II. REFERRAL PLANS AS ILLEGAL LOTTERIES
In the relatively few cases reaching appellate courts involving re-
ferral sales, divergent results have been reached as to whether the obliga-
tions entered into may be enforced by the financing agent to which they
have been negotiated. An unexpected, but uniquely successful, argument
which has been utilized is that the referral sale is nothing more than a
lottery.2 The Florida Constitution provides that lotteries are prohibited
in this state.8 They are also prohibited by statute. Furthermore, Congress
in the exercise of its power to prescribe what may and what may not be
carried by the mail, has provided that no letter or circular concerning
any lottery, and no lottery ticket, etc., shall be deposited or carried in
the mail or delivered at or through any post office, and that any person
knowingly violating such provision shall be punished. 5
Although lotteries are clearly illegal, legislators have been reluctant
to define the term. This reluctance is due to the fact that a precise
definition would enable ingenious and unscrupulous persons to devise a
plan which may not be within the scope of the mischief which the law
seeks to remedy.' Since there is no precise definition either by the Florida
Legislature or case law, the courts must decide what schemes are lotteries
on a case by case basis.7 An examination of judicial decisions indicates
that the cases are either criminal proceedings involving injunctions8 or
restraining orders9 or habeas corpus proceedings against public officials
for their acts in suppressing lotteries."0
2. The Federal Trade Commission hopes to abolish the gasoline giveaway games by
declaring them to be a lottery and thereby illegal. NEWSWEEK, July 29, 1968, at 69.
3. FLA. CoNsT. art. IV, § 23.
4. FLA. STAT. H9 849.09 (1967) et seq.
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1301-02.
6. Blackburn v. Ippolito, 156 So.2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
7. Dorman v. Public-Saenger-Sparks Theatres, 135 Fla. 284, 184 So. 886 (1938) (whether
the perpetration of certain stated acts under certain stated conditions constitutes the
conducting of a lottery is a question of law for the courts to determine, while whether the
alleged acts were perpetrated under the alleged conditions is a matter of fact which may
be determined by a jury or in chancery by the chancellor).
8. Victor v. State, 141 Fla. 508, 193 So. 762 (1940).
9. E.g. Lee v. Miami, 121 Fla. 93, 163 So. 486 (1935) (a decree restraining defendants
from enforcing their vested powers under a statute which regulated coin-operated devices
was reversed); see also Gibson v. Robinson, 127 Fla. 88, 172 So. 476 (1937) and Little
River Theatre Corp. v. State, 135 Fla. 854, 185 So. 855 (1939).
10. Hardison v. Coleman, 121 Fla. 892, 164 So. 520 (1935) (petitioner was entitled to
habeas corpus on the ground that the warrant described no offense since a slot machine
was not a "lottery").
COMMENTS
A lottery has three elements:11 (1) a prize 2 (2) awarded by
chance, 3 (3) for a consideration.' Criminal intent is immaterial.'5
A. Jurisdictions Applying the Lottery Approach
The Washington Supreme Court in Sherwood & Roberts-Yakima,
Inc. v. Leach,' 6 found a referral selling agreement illegal and unenforce-
able. In that case the plaintiff, assignee of a conditional sales contract
for the purchase of a home fire alarm system, sued the defendant-
purchaser upon default. The assignor-seller obtained the contract using
a referral sales scheme, known to the plaintiff at the time of assignment,
as an inducement. The contract provided for the seller to pay the pur-
chaser $100 for each sale made to purchaser's sixty referrals. The sales-
man assured defendants that the commissions would be at least adequate
to cover the purchase price of the equipment. 7 Defendants furnished
sixty names but received no commissions. The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington held that chance permeated the entire scheme of referral selling,
that the agreement was contrary to the terms and policy of the lottery
statute, and therefore was illegal and unenforceable. The conditional
sales contract was found to be so intimately connected with the illegal
agreement as to be itself unenforceable. The court found the elements
of a lottery (prize, chance, and consideration) to be present. The promised
commissions and bonuses constituted the prize; the conditional sales
contract provided the consideration; and chance dominated any require-
ment of skill in the allocation of prizes. The argument that the judgment
of defendants in selecting names and the skill of the salesman were the
dominant factors in determining whether a commission would be paid
was rejected.' It is also important to note that lotteries are prohibited in
11. Little River Theatre Corp. v. State, 135 Fla. 854, 185 So. 855 (1939). Blackburn
v. Ippolito, 156 So.2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
12. In United Jewelers' Mfg. Co. v. Keckley, 77 Kan. 797, 90 P. 781 (1907) each
purchaser of goods received from the seller, in furtherance of an advertising scheme, a
certificate entitling him to a gift of a hat pin, which was the same in each case. The court
held that the contract was not void as part of a gift enterprise. Therefore, it would seem,
inequality of distribution is the essence of a prize.
13. The weight of authority is to the effect that this requirement is met as long as
chance, and not skill or judgment, is the controlling factor. Commonwealth v. Laniewski,
173 Pa. Super. 245, 98 A.2d 215 (1953); State v. Brotherhood of Friends, 41 Wash. 2d
133, 247 P.2d 787 (1952). Cf. United States v. Rosenblum, 121 F. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1903).
14. Glover v. Malloska, 238 Mich. 216, 213 N.W. 107 (1927) (one cent is enough);
Blackburn v. Ippolito, 156 So.2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963) (following those cases adhering to
the contract definition of consideration as opposed to purely pecuniary consideration).
15. Grello v. State, 142 Fla. 236, 194 So. 638 (1940).
16. 67 Wash.2d 630, 409 P.2d 160 (1965).
17. The fire alarm system was priced at $898, but valued at $225.
18. The test of the character of a game or scheme as one of chance or skill is which
of these factors is dominant in determining the result. Peoples v. Settles, 29 Cal. App.2d 781,
78 P.2d 274 (1938). See Cresh v. State, 131 Fla. 111, 179 So. 149 (1938). See also Morse,
The Dominant Element Rule, 58 Dick. L. REv. 394 (1954).
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Washington under its constitution 9 and by statute.20 In addition, the
argument was made that since the assignee was not a party to the trans-
action, he was not in pari delecto and could maintain the action."' The
court rejected this contention by saying that a finance company's par-
ticipation is required, and the financing company agreed at the time of
contracting that the conditional sale contract would be assigned.
A recent Florida case involved a similar factual situation. 22 De-
fendants purchased a vacuum cleaning unit on a conditional sales con-
tract. As part of the transaction a commission agreement was executed,
whereby defendants were to furnish the seller-assignor with a list of
prospective purchasers in return for a commission of $50 for each sale
to anyone so referred. In addition, each prospect submitted by the
purchasers would be offered the same proposal. For each person referred
by the second level prospects, the original purchasers would be paid an
additional sum of $50. The salesman assured defendants that the com-
missions would pay for the vacuum cleaning unit and in addition yield
an indeterminate amount of profit despite the fact that the vacuum unit
was priced at $975, but valued at $180. The note was assigned to the
plaintiff-finance company, which, after defendants defaulted on their
payments, brought suit for the unpaid purchase price. The District Court
of Appeal, First District did not deem it necessary to decide whether
the referral sales plan constituted a lottery within the constitutional con-
cept of that term because of the enactment of Florida statute section
849.091.23 It was the conclusion of the court that the plan used in the
promotion and sale of the vacuum units fell within the purview and
intent of the statute and constituted a lottery.24
19. WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 24.
20. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.59.010 (1961) (a criminal statute providing for punishment
of up to five years in prison or $1,000 fine, or both, for anyone conducting a lottery).
21. Where the contract is illegal, so that both parties are involved in the illegality, but
are not in pari delecto-that is, both have not, with the same knowledge, engaged in the
same transaction-a court of equity may aid the one who is comparatively the more in-
nocent. 3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 942 (5th ed. S. Symons 1941).
22. M. Lippincott Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Childress, 204 So.2d 919 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1967).
23. Chain letters, pyramid clubs, etc., declared a lottery; prohibited; penalties-
The organization of any chain letter club, pyramid club, or other group or-
ganized or brought together under any plan or device whereby fees or dues or any-
thing of material value to be paid or given by members thereof are to be paid or
given to any other member thereof, which plan or device includes any provision for
the increase in such membership through a chain process of new members securing
other new members and thereby advancing themselves in the group to a position
where such members in turn receive fees, dues or things of material value from
other members, is hereby declared to be a lottery, and whoever shall participate in
any such lottery by becoming a member of, or affiliating with, any such group or
organization or who shall solicit any person for membership or affiliation in any
such group or organization shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof
shall be punished by a fine of not less than 100 dollars, nor more than 5000 dollars,
or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than two years
or in the state penitentiary not less than one nor more than ten years.
24. M. Lippincott Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Childress, 204 So.2d 919, 923 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1967).
COMMENTS
Along with Washington25 and Florida,26 the courts of Kentucky, 7
and New York28 have reached similar conclusions on analagous factual
situations. It is important to note that in all of these cases state con-
stitutional provisions and statutes were held to be applicable.
However, the courts of Ohio29 and Oklahoma 3 have reached a
different conclusion. In DeWitt Motor Company v. Bodnark,3 ' the
purchaser of an automobile was engaged by the seller as an independent
salesman and was to receive a commission of $100 for each prospective
customer who ultimately purchased automobiles from the retailer. In
answering the question as to whether the contract had a dominating ele-
ment of chance the court said:
If Bodnark purchaser does nothing, he gets nothing. If he
exercises his powers of reason and planning, he may realize a
fulfillment of the contingency of receiving money as a commis-
sion or bonus from DeWitt retailer. This contract, in my
opinion, is one that rewards diligence, initiative and industry.
It is a contract by which commission can only be earned, not
through chance "as is contained in the definition of letter" but
by reason of the volition of Bodnark and the application by him
of judgment, plan and will."2
A similar result was reached in Ohio in First Discount Corp. v. Cua 3
In Yoder v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc.,3 4 the plaintiffs entered into a
contract with defendants whereby they agreed to pay defendant $938
for a water softener. In addition they were to receive $100 for each name
they submitted to the defendant who consummated a contract. In validat-
ing the agreement, the court stated that: "The act of purchasing a share
of General Motors stock has more of the element of a gambling trans-
action than does the one before us."
'3 5
Finally, in A. A. Murphy, Inc. v. Taylor,0 the seller granted to the
purchaser the privilege of securing one or more persons to make a similar
purchase; for each additional sale the original purchaser would receive
a specified sum of money. The court held that since there was no evidence
25. Sherwood & Roberts-Yokima, Inc. v. Leach, 67 Wash.2d 630, 409 P.2d 160 (1965).
26. See cases cited note 22 supra.
27. Commonwealth v. Allen, 404 S.W.2d 464 (Ct. App. Ky. 1966); Commonwealth v.
Campbell, 406 S.W.2d 730 (Ct. App. Ky. 1966).
28. State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc.2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Suli. Ct. 1966).
29. DeWitt Motor Co. v. Bodnark, 169 N.E.2d 660 (Ct. C.P. Ohio 1960); First Discount
Corp. v. Cua, 117 Ohio App. 105, 190 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
30. Krehbeil v. State, 378 P.2d 768 (Okla. 1963); A. A. Murphy, Inc. v. Taylor, 383
P.2d 648 (Okla. 1963).
31. See cases cited note 29 supra.
32. 169 N.E.2d 660, 668 (Ct. C.P. Ohio 1960).
33. 117 Ohio App. 105, 190 N.E.2d 695 (Ct. App. Ohio 1962).
34. 202 N.E.2d 329 (Ct. C.P. 1963).
35. Id. at 331 N.E.2d 329 (Ct. C.P. 1963).
36. 383 P.2d 648 (Okla. 1963).
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that the purchaser agreed to secure other persons to participate in the
plan, the referral agreement was not a lottery.
7
B. Is the Assignee a Holder in Due Course?
An extensive review of the rights of a holder in due course as it
relates to consumer installment credit paper is beyond the scope of this
article." However, it is important to consider this argument as it relates
to referral sales.
The Uniform Commercial Code protects a financial institution that
buys negotiable paper as a holder in due course, 0 unless the consumer
can prove: (1) that the holder had notice that ... the instrument is over-
due or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on
the part of any person; 4° or (2) the consumer signed the note under
such misrepresentation that he had neither knowledge nor reasonable
opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms.4
The problem arises in the following manner: a retail buyer agrees with
a retail seller to purchase personal property (such as a vacuum cleaning
unit) on the installment plan. He makes a down payment and gives a
negotiable promissory note for the balance secured by a conditional sales
contract. The note along with the security device are then transferred by
the seller to a finance company or bank. If the buyer defaults in the
payment of the note, the finance company will bring suit claiming to be
a holder in due course free from any personal defenses which the buyer
may have against the original seller. Thus, the courts have to decide the
policy question as to where the loss will fall. On the one hand the con-
sumer should be protected from unscrupulous merchants. On the other
hand, encouragement of commerce through easy negotiability of com-
mercial paper is desirable. There are indications of increasing judicial
concern for consumer protection in the kind of situation where a financial
institution is an active participant in the credit transaction between a
retail seller and buyer. 42
37. See also Krehbeil v. State, 378 P.2d 768 (Okla. 1963) (similar result on similar
facts).
38. King, The Unprotected Consumer-Maker Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
65 DicK. L. REv. 207 (1961); Dodge. Referral Sales Contracts: To Alter or Abolish?, 15
BurTALo L. REV. 699 (1966). See also Comment, Finance Companies and Banks as Holders
in Due Course of Consumer Installment Credit Paper, 55 Nw U.L. REv. 389 (1960); Com-
ment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Protection,
114 U. PA. L. REv. 395 (1966).
39. FLA. STAT. §§ 673.3-302, 673.3-305 (1967).
40. FLA. STAT. § 673.3-305(1)(c) (1967).
41. FLA. STAT. § 673.3-305(2)(c) (1967).
42. In the landmark case of Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d
260 (1940) the buyer executed a promissory note and a conditional sales contract in the
installment purchase of an automobile. The buyer had a defense of fraud which he wished
to assert when he was sued on the note by the finance company, to whom the note and
contract had been transferred by the automobile dealer. The court held that the finance
company was not a holder in due course of the negotiable note despite the fact that it had
no actual notice of the fraud.
COMMENTS
Florida has accepted the "active participation" doctrine in refusing
to permit finance companies to claim the status of a holder in due course
in similar situations.4"
In Federal Credit Bureau v. Zelkor Dining Car Corp.," the court
construed the note and accompanying security device as one instrument,
the note thus becoming subject to all the terms and defenses of the
accompanying security device. In effect, this makes the note non-nego-
tiable in this type of consumer credit transaction.
In addition to the developing case law, several commentators have
suggested that in the area of commercial paper under the Code, the con-
sumer-maker lacks sufficient protection in dealings involving negotiable
paper. 4
5
In the area of referral sales, the holder in due course argument has
either not been raised, or, where it has been raised, it has not met with
success.
In Matthews v. Aluminum Acceptance Corp.,4' the defendant was
found to be a holder in due course. In an action by the purchaser of
aluminum house siding to enjoin enforcement of a note and secured
mortgage, it appeared that the payee of the note represented that the
makers had been chosen as demonstrators of the siding, that they would
receive an immediate loan, and would receive $100 for each potential
customer brought by the seller to the house. No potential customers ap-
peared. The court held that the mortgage was procured by fraud and
that the contract was unenforceable.
In Norman v. World Wide Distributors, Inc.,47 the purchaser of a
note, executed by a buyer under a referral sales plan, had dealt with the
referral seller over a period of one year. The court held that the purchaser
of the note clearly had enough knowledge to put it on inquiry as to the
seller's fraudulent acts, had not acted in good faith, and was denied the
defense of a holder in due course.
43. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953) ; accord, Palmer v. Associated
Discount Corp., 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Schuck v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 220
Ark. 56, 247 S.W.2d 260 (1952); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Wks.,
34 Cal.2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950); Industrial Credit Co. v. Mike Bradford & Co., 177
So.2d 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Matthews v. Aluminum Acceptance Corp., 1 Mich. App. 570,
137 N.W.2d 280 (1965); Taylor v. Atlas Security Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W.2d 746
(1923); Local Acceptance Co. v. Kincade, 361 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. 1962); Buffalo Industrial
Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742, 296 N.Y.S. 783 (1937), rev'd on other grounds, 6
N.Y.S.2d 568 (1937); Wilson Bros. Sand & Gravel v. Cheyenne Nat'l Bank, 389 P.2d 681
(Wyo. 1964); contra, Citizen's & So. Nat'l Bank v. Stepp, 126 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Fla. 1954).
44. 238 App. Div. 379, 264 N.Y.S. 723 (1933).
45. See note 38 supra.
46. 1 Mich. App. 570, 137 N.W.2d 280 (1965). See also Pennsylvania Secur. Comm'n.
v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428 (1964).
47. 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963) following Mills v. World Wide Distributs.,
Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 59, 195 A.2d 118 (1963).
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Finally, in Taylor v. Brookline Savings & Trust Co.,48 the court in
applying a Tennessee statute found that a bank was not a holder in due
course because the notes had been filled in after they had been signed
and because the bank, through its long experience with the construction
company, must be charged with knowledge of its fraudulent procedures.
A different result occurred in a situation where the buyer had agreed
in a conditional sales contract not to assert defenses he had against the
seller if sued by a purchaser of the contract. 9 Case law has generally held
that parties to a retail installment agreement may contract to waive certain
defenses, so long as public policy is not contravened.5
"Consumer goods" are defined by Florida statute section 679.9-109
(1967) as those articles used for personal, family or household purposes.
Florida Statutes, section 679.9-206(1) provides that when the install-
ment buyer as part of the same transaction executes both a security agree-
ment and a negotiable instrument, he is deemed as a matter of law to
have agreed not to assert against the assignee or holder of the instrument
any claim or defense that may exist between the buyer and seller of the
goods, absent state statutes or judicial decisions to the contrary.
Taking into account the provisions of the Code5' and Florida case
law,52 the following caveat is posed: If a buyer has agreed in a conditional
sales contract not to assert defenses he has against the seller if sued by
an innocent purchaser for value of the contract, how would a Florida court
decide the case in an action between the buyer and an innocent purchaser
for value? It is the opinion of this writer that the Florida courts may be
sympathetic toward the buyer in view of Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin,5'
but the better view which recognizes the commercial need for freely nego-
tiable or assignable paper would allow the innocent purchaser of the con-
ditional sales contract to prevail.
III. UNCONSCIONABILITY-A WORKABLE ALTERNATIVE
A workable alternative to the lottery approach to the referral sale
scheme lies in the "Unconscionability" provision of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.5 4 The most important case to date in this area is Williams
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.55 The plaintiff, an operator of a retail
48. 405 S.W.2d 590 (Tenn. App. 1964).
49. Lundstrom v. Radio Corp., 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P.2d 339 (1965) ; See Annot., 44
A.L.R.2d 162 (1955).
50. Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 162 (1955).
51. FLA. STAT. § 679.9-206 (1967).
52. See cases cited note 43 supra.
53. 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953). This solution, if too widely applied, conflicts with the
commercial need for freely negotiable or assignable paper.
54. FLA. STAT. '§ 672.2-302 (1967). See also Davenport, Unconscionability and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MsAmX L. REV. 121 (1967).
55. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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furniture store, sold a $500 stereo set on an installment contract to the
defendant Williams. The defendant was a woman of limited education and
maintained herself and seven children on public assistance payments of
$218 per month, as plaintiff knew. The plaintiff utilized an "add-on" pro-
vision under an installment contract which credited each payment pro rata
against all outstanding accounts, thereby allowing plaintiff to retain a
collateral interest in all items until every purchase had been paid in full.
After having paid most of the installments, the defendant defaulted and
the plaintiff sought to replevy all purchases. Defendant contended that
plaintiff's knowledge of her precarious financial position should preclude
recovery on the contract. The trial court found no ground for denying
recovery and the appellate court affirmed. 6 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to determine whether the con-
tract was unconscionable. The appellate court stated that the contract
would be unenforceable if there was present an element of unconscion-
ability at the time the contract was made. Although the Uniform Com-
mercial Code was not enacted in the District of Columbia until after the
contract in issue had been executed, 7 the court reasoned that enactment
of section 2-302 did not necessarily change the law, nor preclude the
court from adopting a similar rule "in the exercise of its power to develop
the common law." 8 Section 2-302 supplied persuasive authority for fol-
lowing the rationale of the cases from which the section was derived. 9
The court cited Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,60 as supporting its
position. In Henningsen, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a
manufacturer's disclaimer of liability was against public policy because
of unequal bargaining power,6" lack of meaningful choice, 2 and lack of
notice of the disclaimer.63 The court in Williams directed the trial court
to consider similar factors in determining whether the contract was un-
conscionable.6 4 In addition, the court suggested that sellers of consumer
goods may have a duty to import to purchasers an understanding of the
contract's consequences.
The term "unconscionable" is obviously rather inexact 0 and is not
56. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964).
57. The U.C.C. was enacted on Dec. 30, 1963, and went into effect on January 1, 1965. 77
Stat. 630 (1963). The contract in question was executed in April of 1962.
58. 350 F.2d at 449.
59. See U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
60. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
61. Id. at 358, 388, 161 A.2d at 85.
62. Id. at 390, 161 A.2d at 87.
63. Id. at 399, 161 A.2d at 92.
64. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
65. Section 2-302 has been criticized for vagueness and interference with contractual
freedom. See, e.g., Babb, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 14 ME. L. Rav. 1, 9-10
(1962); King, Suggested Changes in the Uniform Commercial Code, 33 ORE. L. REv. 113,
114 (1953); Comment, Policing Contracts Under the Proposed Commercial Code, 18 U. CHI.
L. RE V. 146, 152 (1951); But see Hart, In Defense of Certain Provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code Relating to Formation of Sales Contracts: A Partial Reply to Professor
Babb, 15 ME. L. REv. 21 (1961).
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easily applied to specific contractual provisions. The test suggested by
the comment to section 2-302 is "whether, in the light of the general
commercial needs of the particular trade or use, the clauses involved are
so one-sided as to be unconscionable ....",66 Although this test provides
some guidance, only judicial decisions will be able to define the limits of
unconscionability in specific cases.
It is the writer's opinion that the unconscionable approach to busi-
ness promotional schemes would be better suited for the purpose than
the lottery approach. This approach would enable the court to focus its
attention on the unfairness and deception of a particular scheme as
opposed to concentrating on the elements (prize, chance and considera-
tion) necessary for a lottery. Also, a finding of "unconscionability" would
not render the business promoter or the purchaser participant a felon."
The lottery concept is ill-suited for the commercial world, whereas the
unconscionability doctrine is especially applicable to a business setting
and for the regulation of economic activity. Furthermore, a sweeping
statement that referral sales are lotteries implies that all such plans are
abusive and unfair. This may not be a fair generalization. For example,
what if the purchaser pays cash for the personal property and, in addition,
is to receive commission payments or refunds for providing the seller with
additional buyers? This plan may have substantial economic merit but
would probably be stricken.
IV. OTHER ALTERNATIVES
A. Tort Theory of Misrepresentation
The referral sales scheme could be attacked by using the tort theory
of misrepresentation.68 To constitute fraud a (1) misrepresentation must
be of a (2) specific material fact that it is (3) untrue and (4) known to
be so and (5) stated for the purpose of inducing another to act, upon
which statement the other (6) relies in action to his (7) injury.69 In Stack-
pole v. Hancock,70 the court held that a party negotiating for the purchase
of property need not reveal facts solely within his knowledge as to the
property value, but that if he undertook to do so, he must disclose the
whole truth.
In the recent Florida case, M. Lippincott Mortgage Investment Co.
66. FiA. STAT. § 672.2-302 (1967), Comment 1 (1967).
67. FLA. STAT. § 849.091 (1967) provides that:
[Wihoever shall participate in any such lottery by becoming a member of, or
affiliating with, any such group or organization or who shall solicit any person for
membership or affiliation in any such group or organization shall be guilty of a
felony ....
68. See generally W. PRossaa, TORTS '§§ 100-05 (3d ed. 1964).
69. Ball v. Ball, 160 Fla. 601, 36 So.2d 172 (1948); Sutton v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 138
Fla. 692, 189 So. 828 (1939) ; Nixon v. Temple Terrace Estates, Inc., 97 Fla. 409, 122 So. 274
(1929) ; Huffstetler v. Our Home Life Ins., 67 Fla. 324, 6S So. 1 (1914).
70. 40 Fla. 362, 24 So. 914 (1898).
COMMENTS
v. Childress'71 the representation by the salesman that the prospective
purchasers would yield commissions sufficient in amount to pay in full
the promissory note plus unlimited amounts of gain 72 would seem to meet
the above requirements. However, in order for a misrepresentation to be
the basis of a claim for relief it must relate to a past 78 or existing74 fact.
Statements of expectation are not grounds for fraud, where the parties are
dealing at arm's length.71 Since the misrepresentation (sufficient commis-
sions to pay in full the promissory note) is predicated upon a future event,
the misrepresentation theory may not provide a satisfactory defense. The
same problem would result with a false pretense statute.76
B. The Post Office
The two postal fraud statutes-the one providing for criminal penal-
ties for use of the mail to defraud,77 and the other, an administrative
statute giving the Postmaster General the power to stop incoming mail
from reaching the fraudulent operator 78-have been effective govern-
mental protections for the consumer.
In Pereira v. United States,79 the court stated:
The elements of the offense of mail fraud under U.S.C. (Supp.
U) § 1341 are (1) a scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing of
a letter, etc., for the purpose of executing the scheme contem-
plates the use of the mails as an essential element. 80
There is no requirement that anyone be defrauded or even that a likeli-
hood exist that someone will be defrauded."' However, proof of intent to
defraud is a requisite for conviction under both the criminal statute2
and the administrative statute.8 3
71. 204 So.2d 919 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1967).
72. Id. at 920.
73. Stokes v. Victory Land Co., 99 Fla. 795, 128 So. 408 (1930).
74. Williams v. McFadden, 23 Fla. 143, 1 So. 618 (1887).
75. Hart v. Murphy, 82 Fla. 317, 90 So. 173 (1921).
76. It is generally held that to constitute a false pretense there must be an "assertion of
an existing fact, not a promise to perform some act in the future." Commonwealth v.
Moore, 99 Pa. 570, 574 (1882). California is the only state whose courts have held that
false pretenses include all promises made with intent not to perform. People v. Ashley, 42
Cal. 2d 246, 265, 267 P.2d 271, 283, (1954) cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1954).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964).
78. 74 Stat. 654 (1960), 39 U.S.C. § 4005 (1964).
79. 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
80. Id. at 8.
81. Hermansen v. United States, 230 F.2d 173-74 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 924 (1956); United States v. Sylvanus, 192 F.2d 96, 106 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 943 (1952).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964) provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by fraudulent pretenses . . . shall be fined not
more than 1000 dollars or imprisoned not more than five years or both.
83. The United States Supreme Court in Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269, 277 (1949) held
that the Federal Trade Commission has the authority to issue cease and desist orders with-
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Although hampered by a small staff and an increasing number of
charges of mail fraud, the postal authorities have great potential in curb-
ing fraudulent mail practices.
C. Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction over "deceptive acts
or practices" 4 in advertising is another major governmental effort in
the fraud prevention area. The Supreme Court has remarked that the
Federal Trade Commission has wide discretion in the choice of remedies
to cope with deceptive advertising practices.8 " As a result, the Commis-
sion has devised a variety of devices to end an unlawful practice. 6
Generally, the FTC's efforts have been curtailed because of the
limited scope of the enforcement power and its inability to make expedi-
tious determinations.8 7
V. Conclusion
The lawyer representing a buyer who has been the victim of a re-
ferral sales scheme has at least two avenues of approach, either of which
is likely to result in success, i.e., the lottery approach and the uhconscion-
ability approach.
Dodge has suggested 8 as an alternative method of handling referral
sales contracts that states pass specific legislation that would (1) pro-
hibit selling or offering for sale any consumer goods or services at a price
unreasonably higher than the usual or ordinary price and (2) limit either
the percentage of sales made on referral or limit the buyer's debt by re-
ferral commission payments.8 9 It is the opinion of this author that the
unconscionability approach can give the same result and in addition is
more satisfactory since it avoids the doctrinal problems of the lottery and
tort approaches. The effectiveness of the unconsionability approach will
depend upon the judicial attitude of the courts. It is hoped that the atti-
tudes of the Florida courts will be favorable.
out proof of fraudulent intent, but that the FTC order "does not approach the severity of
a mail order fraud."
84. 52 Stat. 111 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1964).
85. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611-612 (1946).
86. In addition the power to seek temporary injunctions in cases involving the ad-
vertising of foods, drugs, and cosmetics, the Commission, under its cease and desist power,
sometimes merely requires a change in the wording of an advertisement. See, e.g., Keele Hair
& Scalp Specialists, Inc., 55 F.T.C. 1840 (1959), or requires that explanatory language be
added in order to remove deception, American Medicinal Prods., Inc., v. FTC, 136 F.2d
426 (9th Cir. 1943).
87. Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 CoLum. L. REV. 1018, 1039 (1956).
88. Dodge, Referral Sales Contracts: To Alter or Abolish?, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 669
(1966).
89. Id. at 692-96.
